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ABSTRACT
 
This paper describes the agricultural sector in the 
western region of Uzbekistan, the most populous of the former 
Soviet Central Asian Republics. Agriculture in this region, 
as in all of Uzbekistan, is entirely dependent on irrigation, 
as has been the case for millennia. Evidence of settlement of 
the desert oases and the banks of the Amu Darya River (known 
as the Oxus in ancient times) dates back many millennia, as 
does settlement of the short of the Aral Sea, largely based on 
fishing. However, the Aral Sea Region of Uzbekistan, 
including the Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan and 
Khorezm Oblast, the currently undergoing severe ecological 
stress, as is the entire Aral Sea Basin. Massive expansion of 
irrigated area starting in the 1960's has resulted in a steady 
shrinkage of the Aral Sea, whose shoreline is now some 100 
kilometers beyond its former location. There are now problems 
wi th extreme salinization of the sea water, which supports 
many fewer species than previously, as well as wind-blown salt 
from the flats left by the retreating waters. In addition, 
poor irrigation management has caused severe problems with 
waterlogging and salinity in upstream areas. 
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Agriculture in the Republic of Karakalpakstan and Khorezm Oblast 
of Uzbekistan 
Introduction 
This paper describes the agricultural sector in the western 
region of Uzbekistan, the most populous of the former Soviet 
Central Asian Republics. Agriculture in this region, as in all of 
Uzbekistan, is entirely dependent on irrigation, as has been the 
case for millenia. Evidence of settlement of the desert oases and 
the banks of the Amu Darya River (known as the Oxus in ancient 
times) dates back many millenia, as does settlement of the shore of 
the Aral Sea, largely based on fishing. 
However, the Aral Sea Region of Uzbekistan, including the 
Autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan and Khorezm Oblast, is 
currently undergoing severe ecological stress, as is the entire 
Aral Sea Basin. Massive expansion of irrigated area starting in 
the 1960's has reduced the river flow to nil in low water periods, 
and has resulted in a steady shrinkage of the Aral Sea, whose 
shoreline is now some 100 kilometers beyond its former location. 
There are now problems with with extreme salinization of the sea 
water, which supports many fewer species than previously, as well 
as wind blown salt from the flats left by the retreating waters. 
In addition, poor irrigation management has caused severe problems 
with waterlogging and salinity in upstream areas. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union has not been accompanied by 
massive social or political reorganization in Uzbekistan since the 
former communist party boss remained in power as the dictator of 
the country and the state control apparatus is largely still 
functioning. Nevertheless, it is recognized that some market 
oriented reforms would be beneficial, though there has as yet been 
no radical redirection of the economic system. In agriculture, 
this means a continuation of the old system in which planting 
decisions are made by the central government in Tashkent, and 
transmitted down through the hierarchy to the oblast level, the 
raion level and the collective farm level. The designated crops 
are then cultivated with machinery and supplies provided by the 
state, and are sold at prices dictated by the state, which has a 
monopoly on trade of important cash crops. There has been some 
liberalization, particularly in the area of fruits and vegetables, 
but the bulk of the land is still farmed as it was under the Soviet 
Union. 
Cotton is the dominant crop in Karakalpakstan and Khorezm, as 
it is in the country as a whole, though production in the Aral Sea 
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region accounts for only around 10% of national cotton production. 
Given the fact that agriculture accounted for 28.5% of GDP in 1995, 
between 40 and 50% of total employment, while providing between 2/3 
and 4/5 of export revenues, it is clear that the development of 
agriculture in general has significant implications for the country 
as a whole as well as being the dominant sector in the western 
region. For this reason, successful reforms in the Aral Sea region 
can be important in terms of demonstrating possibilities for the 
whole country. 
Other important crops in this area include rice, which has 
long been grown in the delta of the Amu Darya, cattle and fodder 
crops, and various horticultural products, most of which are 
produced on private plots rather than larger units. Wheat has 
recently become more important as state orders have been imposed to 
fulfill the central government desire for grain independence, 
particularly from Kazakhstan. Alfalfa is grown to feed cattle 
along with some maize, and cattle are also fed byproducts from 
cotton and rice production. Aquaculture is also practiced in 
Khorezm region in lakes in the east of the oblast. 
Output Trends 
Tables 1 and 2 show agricultural output in Karakalpakstan and 
Khorezm for the past two years. It can be seen that cotton and 
grains are the dominant crops. Of grains, rice is the most widely 
cultivated but wheat has become increasingly important over the 
past few years. Tables 3 and 4 show the areas planted to the major 
crops. 
Cotton is still produced almost entirely by the collectives, 
and its absence on private lands reflects the poor incentives 
inherent in the state order and pricing system. Table 5 shows 
returns on cotton producing kolkhozes in Karakalpakstan, where it 
can be seen that everyone lost money last year and only one rayon 
had a positive result in 1995. Private sector producers 
concentrate on horticultural crops and livestock, together with 
rice. Tables 6 and 7 show figures for livestock breeding, where 
the large share of the private sector in the total is evident. 
Table 8 shows that livestock is the predominant activity of dekhan 
farms in Khorezm. 
Yields in Karakalpakstan are quite low compared to those in 
other parts of Uzbekistan. Table 9 shows figures for the five 
regions, and it can be seen that the Aral Sea region lags behind 
all others by a substantial margin. The figures above indicate 
..
that Karakalpakstan is in fact lower still than that for the Aral 
Sea Region in general. 
Declining yield is a particular problem in the cotton 
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subsector and one that is recognized by the authorities. There are 
various reasons for this, including both economic and technical 
problems. Foremost in economic terms are the low prices received 
for seed cotton, as well as the difficulties and vagaries of state 
supply of fertilizers. One macronutrient, potassium, was not 
supplied at all in 1996 while supplies of phosphorus were 
negligible (see below). Foremost among technical problems are 
those associated with irrigation, with salinity, rising water 
tables, and hard pans being the most important. 
It should be noted that yield figures from the soviet era may 
well be overstated and so cannot be regarded as a reliable 
benchmark from which to measure trends. However, it does seem that 
yields do have a downward trend in the cotton subsector. 
Land Tenure 
The dominant forms of land tenure during the Soviet era were 
the sovkhoz, or state farm, and the kolkhoz, or collective farm. 
State farms (sovkhoz) were large farm units run on the same 
basis as manufacturing or industrial enterprises in that employees 
were paid a salary. There are currently no remaining state farms 
in Karakalpakstan or Khorezm apart from those dedicated to plant 
research or experimentation. 
Collectives (kolkhoz) are large farms, often including housing 
or other activities, which are technically run by their members, 
though local authorities of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water 
are in de facto control of operations. Technically, farmers do not 
receive salaries, but rather are paid according to their output. In 
practice, monthly paYments are made with a bonus at the end of the 
year according to the value of the crop produced. Large capital 
investments are paid for by the State but maintenance costs are the 
responsibility of the collective. 
In many cases, the paYment of kolkhoz workers is often made 
in-kind in the form of food or other commodities and is often in 
arrears. For example, many farms had still not been paid for the 
previous year's harvest by May of 1997, though planting for the 
following crop year had already begun. 
Collectives have become by far the most important form of 
organization and by 1995 accounted for 1,937 miliion hectares out 
of a total of approximately 2,2 million in the country as a whole. 
­This increase has come about mainly through the conversion of state 
farms into collectives. 
4 
Dekhan farms are independent household farms which are leased 
by a household, individual or group, and which, in theory, can make 
their own planting decisions and maintain their own finances. 
However, the extent to which these farms are in fact independent of 
centralized administration and control is quite limited in 
Karakalpakstan, though it seemed to be somewhat greater in at least 
some cases in Khorezm. 
Leasehold peasant farms (arednoe khozyaistvo) are farms which 
are leased from a collective or local government. In practice, 
these are somewhat similar to private livestock farms, which result 
from privatization of the livestock activities of the kolkhoz, but 
which may be operated as a joint stock company with the state. 
Even in cases where the state is not part owner, there may be 
conditions on the granting of the lease which require provision of 
some portion of output to the lessor. 
Household plots are areas of 1/4 hectare, usually adjacent to 
or surrounding the house and farmed as private holdings. These 
plots provide the bulk of horticultural crops as well as dairy and 
meat products. All of this output is freely sold and traded in 
urban markets. 
"Privatization" - Real or Illusory? 
Karakalpakstan and Khorezm have lagged behind the rest of the 
country in the transfer of land from central control. As can be 
seen in Table 10 the land under central administration in the Aral 
Sea Region had decreased by only 4% in 1996 as compared to 1990. 
While it is clear that there has been some move toward new 
independent farms such as dekhans and private farms, there was much 
confusion among people interviewed as to exactly what this meant, 
and also some differences between Karakalpakstan and Khorezm. 
In Khorezm, it is apparent that there has been growth in the 
number of dekhan farmers, that many, if not most of these are free 
to grow the crops they wish, but that if they grow crops subject to 
state orders, then they must comply with them. For this reason, 
dekhan farmers in Khorezm avoid cotton and wheat, which are not 
economic in their opinion, and concentrate instead on rice and 
cattle, where prices are more attractive and the possibility of 
exceeding the plan and so having supplies to sell at free market 
prices is much greater. The association of dekhan and private 
farmers has merged into one association in the oblast, and helps 
supply inputs purchased from the state, and gives advice on 
management and other issues. Membership is obligatory, being 
financed by a per hectare tax averaging 500 soum. 
-

In Karakalpakstan it is clear that in many, and probably most 
cases, the change from collective to dekhan farming had little 
practical significance. Even in cases where dekhans are formed, 
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these farms are still subject to state orders, still receive all 
inputs from state supplies, and still are subject to controlled 
prices set by the state. Kolkhoz managers have little option in 
this regard since the target amounts in state orders are not 
reduced when the kolkhoz spins off some or all of its land to 
dekhans. For this reason, dekhans formed on cotton producing 
kolkhozes were seen which are still required to grow cotton, in 
order to help meet the state plan. In effect, the move from 
sovkhoz to kolkhoz and from kolkhoz to dekhan has had little or no 
discernable effect on the actual performance and management of 
farming activities. 
There is one exception to this generalization. Workers on 
sovkhoz received salaries rather than sharing the value of output 
produced. Accordingly, the virtual elimination of this category of 
farm has reduced most farmers on centrally administered units to 
relying on the vagaries of state paYment for procurement of 
outputs. These paYments are routinely in arrears, sometimes by a 
substantial amount of time. In fact, many farms had still not 
received paYment in May of 1997 for the previous year's harvest, 
even though planting had already begun. 
Accordingly, seeds and fertilizers are provided without prior 
paYment, and farmers, when they are paid, are often paid in kind in 
the form of food or other necessities. In effect, this is a 
reversion to the physical planning typical of the Soviet era, and 
represents a further entrenchment of the command system of the 
past. 
While there is anecdotal evidence that private plots may be 
expanding somewhat beyond the 1/4 hectare allowed under previous 
decrees, it proved impossible to verify this, as official 
statements were invariably to the effect that private plots were 
limited to this size. Without further survey information, it will 
be difficult to pin this factor down. 
What is clear, however, is that production of horticultural 
crops from these holdings is substantial, and provides a large 
percentage of supplies to the local market. It was also clear that 
there is free trade in these products within Uzbekistan, as all 
local markets had produce originating in Samarkand or other parts 
of the country. 
An important consideration in the move toward independent 
farmers is the provision of social services formerly provided by 
the kolkhoz or sovkhoz. In effect, these organizations provided 
the social safety net for the rural population, and will cease to 
do this as they are replaced by independent farms. The existing 
arrangement, whereby assistance is provided through mahalla ­
committees, will have to be provided with sufficient resources to • 
prevent those most vulnerable from sinking below acceptable levels. 
Meanwhile, it should not be expected that collectives will 
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immediately disappear - rather, they will be replaced as their 
productive functions are taken over by voluntary associations of 
farmers and their social functions are taken over by appropriate 
entities such as the mahalla committees. 
Farm Labor 
Approximately 75% of farm labor is performed by women. This 
means that increasing returns to farm labor, whether directly or 
through higher returns to farming on independent farms via higher 
output prices, will immediately improve the conditions of rural 
women. 
In the past, agriculture has served as a sort of "residual" 
sector of emploYment in that recorded emploYment in this sector 
rose after 1989 while those of other sectors were falling. (ILO 
Discussion Paper No. 14, 1996) To some extent, this reflects the 
fact that some family members of collectives have returned full 
time to the farm sector as emploYment off-farm has become scarcer. 
Overall, labor use in agriculture is reported to be relatively 
high in Uzbekistan, and norms for labor requirements for cotton in 
particular are high compared to those of other crops (see below) . 
It is important to note that there is serious reason to discount 
official statistics of labor input as these are typically inflated 
in order to justify larger payroll paYments on the part of the 
collective, whether or not that labor was actually used for 
farming. It is not surprising to see labor intensive production 
methods with a cost of labor amounting to 114 soum/day, but a 
sustained increase in agricultural incomes will inevitably bring 
greater levels of mechanization in the future. 
However, that future is at present quite some distance away. 
There is among many observers a perceived aversion to manual labor 
and a strong bias toward heavy mechanization that is a product of 
the Soviet experience. However, there is every reason to believe 
that given the proper incentives (i.e the right to the returns 
generated by manual labor) people will do what is optimal, and in 
many phases of farm operations will opt for more labor intensive 
methods. The experience of the few independent leasehold farmers 
in Uzbekistan bears this out, as does the experience of Uzbeks and 
others in surrounding countries. 
Irrigation Issues and Options 
-
By far the most important technical problems for agriculture 
in the Aral Sea region are those relating to irrigation. 
Agriculture, and in fact the ability of people to subsist, is 
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virtually entirely dependent on it. This has been the case for as 
far back in time as records go - civilization on the lower Amu 
Darya has always depended on irrigation for survival, and has 
expanded and contracted along with the availability of water. 
Though there is evidence of irrigation in this area as early 
as 3,500 years ago, it is the expansion of irrigated area during 
the Soviet era coupled with an emphasis on cotton that has resulted 
in maj or changes and problems. While the beginning of Soviet 
expansion of area for cotton production can be traced back to a 
1918 decree by Lenin ("About the organization of irrigation work in 
Turkestan"), it was the massive expansion beginning in the 1960's 
that resulted in the huge environmental problems that exist today. 
These issues have received much attention elsewhere. It is 
not the purpose of this study to attempt to resolve the problems 
relating to the shrinkage of the Aral Sea - rather, an attempt will 
be made to incorporate the results of this overall problem into 
calculations of the appropriate strategy for agriculture in the 
Republic of Karakalpakstan and Khorezm. With regard to irrigation 
and soil quality, there are three major and interrelated issues: 
salinity, high water tables, and hard pans. 
Figures 1 and 2 show schematic representations of the 
irrigation system in the lower Amu Darya. Table 11 shows the 
length and type of irrigation canals in Uzbekistan. It can be seen 
that virtually all canals are unlined in Karakalpakstan and 
Khorezm, and these two regions also have the lowest overall 
efficiency in the country, at 0.63 and 0.65 respectively. 
Overall, Karakalpakstan and Khorezm are predominantly irrigated via 
furrow, while a substantial proportion is irrigated by basin or 
wild flood methods, much of this for rice production. Table 12 
shows the figures for Karakalpakstan and the different oblasts in 
Uzbekistan. 
Table 13 and Figures 3 and 4 show the extent of problems with 
high water tables and with salinity. It can be seen that virtually 
all of Karakalpakstan's water table is less than 5 meters deep, and 
more than 80% is less than three meters deep. The weighted average 
depth for the republic is 2.5 meters according to TACIS data, 
though data from SANIIRI from 1994-96 showed average depths of less 
than two meters in all but three rayons. This problem is more 
severe here than in any other part of the Amu Darya basin. In the 
Nukus region, the water table is reported now to be at an average 
depth of 1.6-1.8 meters. It was reported by the cotton research 
institute in Khorezm that the water table in that oblast is at an 
average of about 1.7 meters. 
-It can also be seen that salinity was a problem on more than 
half of the land in Karakalpakstan as of 1989, and there is reason .> 
to believe this problem may have increased in the years since, due 
to inadequate amelioration and breakdown of the drainage system. 
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It was reported at SANIIRI that problems are particularly severe in 
the Nukus region, with 1 ton/ha. of salt deposited by wind each 
year and 15 from water. Groundwater in this area has a mineral 
content of 8-10 grams per liter, a testament to the poor quality of 
water in the lower portions of the river. Similar levels have been 
found in Khorezm, though irrigation water salinity levels are 
somewhat better due to its upstream location compared to 
Karakalpakstan. 
There is one fundamental point regarding groundwater that it 
is important to emphasize: Excessive irrigation of rice in areas 
unsuited to its production aggravates groundwater level problems. 
Though rice has long been grown in low lying areas of the Amu Darya 
delta, and would likely to continue to be grown there under most 
circumstances, it is currently cultivated on large areas upstream 
from the delta in both Karakalpakstan and Khorezm. According to 
SANIIRI, water application is typically at least 34,000 - 36,000 
m3/ha. and is often on the order of 50,000 m3/ha. or more for each 
crop. Table 14 shows indicative water requirements exclusive of 
water used for leaching. It is clear that rice is under any 
circumstances a "thirsty" crop, and its widespread cultivation 
accounts for a large share of regional water consumption. 
Levels of water use greater than 50,000 m3 /ha. are 
extraordinary and are far beyond anything seen in other parts of 
the world. Such water use is a result of the high permeability of 
the sandy soils typical of these regions, where rates of filtration 
far higher than 10mm an hour (resulting in filtration of about 0.25 
meters/day) have been recorded in various areas. 
What this means is that rice is being grown in areas unsuited 
to its cultivation, and where it would not be grown were it not for 
the fact that water is free. However, a larger problem is the 
effect of such extremely high water use on local groundwater 
levels. In many areas, groundwater levels are high and so are 
causing salinization problems, precisely because rice is being 
grown so extensively and via means which involve massive amounts of 
irrigation. 
These facts point to a very important conclusion: Before 
committing to large and expensive drainage projects, it is 
essential to remove the distortions in relative prices of crops and 
water that generate a large part of the problem. In essence, part 
of the groundwater problem, and the salinization it causes are a 
result of large irrigation works and free water provision from 
them. It is fundamentally mistaken to correct such a problem via 
engineering solutions before correcting the distortions that are a 
large part of the root cause. In a context of liberalized cropping 
­choices based on realistic prices it may well be the case that rice 
cultivation would expand in the lower reaches of the delta where ,­
th~re is low lying land and less of a problem with water 
availability as upstream land in rice production is diverted to 
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other uses, thus ameliorating drainage problems. 
Nevertheless, it is still the case that there is in fact a 
need for rehabiltation, maintenance, and in some fields improved 
drainage to further ameliorate the problems of high water table and 
salinity. Both of these problems are aggravated by the poor 
condition of the drainage system throughout most of the region and 
would remain so even under alternative cropping patterns. In many 
areas, inadequate drainage was installed in the first place, while 
in most of the system little maintenance or cleaning has been 
done since independence. The casual observer can see plugged or 
stagnant drainage canals almost everywhere in Karakalpakstan, but 
the situation appears to be somewhat better in Khorezm. However, 
it was reported in Khorezm that the average length of drainage 
canals per hectare is 37 meters, and that this figure should be 
approximately 50 m/ha to ensure adequate drainage. 
This is a key problem, since adequate or improved drainage is 
the main way to ameliorate the problems of salt and high water 
tables. Salts must be washed down through the root system and 
drained away in order to avoid buildup on the surface and in the 
root zone of the crop. This is impossible in cases where drainage 
does not occur or where it is inadequate. High water tables also 
promote surface salinization but this problem can be lessened 
somewhat by providing adequate drainage for fields. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that on-farm cleaning and excavation of drainage 
canals is capable of lowering the water table significantly. 
Given the expense of construction of new irrigation works, or 
of opening new lands, it seems clear that the best approach at 
present is maintenance and rehabilitation of existing structures. 
This means, first and foremost, the maintenance of the canals, and 
particularly those required to drain fields adequately. In those 
cases where drainage is absent or inadequate, new drainage must be 
installed. Given the public good nature of assuring adequate 
drainage in all areas to maintain the sustainability of production, 
a case can be made for assisting in the installation of new 
drainage where it is shown to be necessary, perhaps by providing 
extension advice or assistance via a labor intensive public works 
program. 
Alternative methods such as drip irrigation are too expensive 
to make them worthwhile in the Aral Sea region. This is 
particularly so since the low elevations and flatness of the entire 
area make gravity fed furrow irrigation or basin flooding the 
preferred and cheapest method. Table 15 shows estimated per 
hectare costs of alternative irrigation technologies, where it can 
be seen that these methods are both more costly to install and more 
­costly to maintain than are other methods. Evidence of this is the 
fact that out of 3,100 ha. of drip irrigation installed in 
Uzbekistan since 1991, only 200 ha. remain operational. In 
addition, experiments with cotton and drip ·irrigation show a 
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substantial water savings but no substantial yield gains, making 
the cost at the farm level prohibitive. (See, WARMAP Phase 2 
"Report on Non Traditional Irrigation", December 1996) 
An interesting aspect of Table 15 is that under current 
conditions (i. e free water) the traditional method of surface 
irrigation is the financially preferred option, but with water 
charges, various low tech improvements on these traditional methods 
become preferred. Under no circumstance are drip or overhead 
methods preferred. 
Finally, perhaps the biggest single issue relating to water is 
the institution of water charges. Currently, the thought of this 
is anathema to many, given their history of free water use. In 
addition, there is an inherent problem in liberalizing input 
markets before output markets have been liberalized as this puts 
farmers in a cost squeeze which will make it difficult or 
impossible to maintain farming as a viable financial proposition. 
Nevertheless, if output markets were to be liberalized then water 
charges could indeed be afforded, and would be the single biggest 
factor in promoting rational water use. Several farmers 
interviewed said that they would be willing to pay for water if 
they could get more of it, indicating that water charges are not as 
unthinkable at the farm level as they are at some levels of the 
bureaucracy. 
Institution of water charges would immediately provide an 
incentive to improve water use efficiency, avoid overirrigation, 
clean supply and drainage systems, and schedule water use for night 
hours when evaporation is less. Other water management problems 
include inappropriate timing of supply; for example, cotton should 
not be watered when first flowering and setting bolls as this may 
cause premature boll drop and excessive vegetative growth. 
However, water is often applied according to a fixed schedule, 
regardless of the stage of growth of the crop. One possibility, 
which would help prevent the problems associated with excessive 
water use for rice cultivation, would be to provide water at a low 
price up to some level, say 2 meters per hectare, with steeply 
increasing fees for amounts above this level. 
An historical note is perhaps appropriate in view of the oft 
repeated assertion that "People here have never paid for water". 
In fact, prior to the Soviet era, that is exactly what they did. 
Under traditional irrigation systems installed by the various 
khanates in Uzbekistan, farmers were responsible for maintenance of 
not only their own on-farm canals, but also for providing labor for 
necessary maintenance on main canals and drainage. Failure to do 
so resulted in fines. Water users were also responsible for 
• payments (often in kind) to the administrators who operated the 
water system. ("History of Irrigation in Uzbekistan and Present 
Problems" Paper presented by A. Karimov at USAID Workshop on Self­
Adjusting Systems in Irrigation, Tashkent, April 29-30, 1997) 
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Cotton Issues 
Cot ton, as the most important crop in Karakalpakstan and 
Khorezm, is the subsector of most interest both to local 
authorities and to the central government in Tashkent. Technical 
and economic problems associated with it are therefore of primary 
importance in any consideration of a development strategy for the 
region as a whole. Crop budget calculations (see below) indicate 
that cotton is currently a profitable crop for the country as a 
whole, but distortions in domestic pricing and marketing have made 
it a losing proposition for individual farm units, while the return 
to the local authorities is substantially reduced by various 
implicit and explicit taxes. Accordingly, restoration of financial 
profitability and incentives appropriate to improved quality and 
yield are of the first importance. 
Cotton is typically grown in rotation with some combination of 
alfalfa, a grain crop and vegetables. Rotation is not only 
beneficial for soil structure and fertility, but it is also the 
most effective control for verticillium wilt, the most important 
disease affecting cotton in Uzbekistan. 
Yield 
As noted above, cotton yields in Karakalpakstan are low and 
declining, while those in Khorezm are somewhat better but also show 
a declining trend. Authorities have taken notice of this and 
efforts are under way to improve the situation in several different 
ways. In terms of technical issues, it is clear that irrigation, 
salinity, and associated issues are the most important, and these 
can only be addressed by a combination of policy changes to improve 
incentives for farmers to maintain irrigation systems, and 
investments on the part of authorities in off-farm components of 
the system. These issues are discussed in detail under the section 
covering irrigation issues. 
Another approach to yield increases is via seed improvement. 
In general, breeding a new variety takes about twelve years, during 
which time the variety is developed at the research institute. 
When varieties are ready for release, the seed is given to the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Water, which then performs 
multiplication and distribution. There is currently a project 
underway intended to strengthen seed production and certification, 
but it has not yet achieved substantial results. 
-

Part of the rationale for this project are the persistent 
problems arising from the practice of using uncertified seeds 
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derived from ginning of cotton production. These seeds are of 
uncertain quality due to the fact that farm managers are free to 
choose whichever seeds they like and can and often do mix 
varieties. This has adverse implications both for the consistency 
of cotton quality even within one farm, and also means that there 
is almost certainly a major problem with maintenance of varietal 
characteristics from year to year. In general, once a variety has 
been released from a research institute, there is no further 
involvement of plant breeders in maintenance of the variety. 
Current efforts to address these problems under the Cotton 
Improvement Project should be aided as much as possible by regional 
authorities, and an attempt made to facilitate the integration of 
plant breeding and agronomic research into the seed multiplication 
and supply process. 
Among the strategies being studied in Karakalpakstan are one 
to increase planting density. These methods resulted in an 
increase in yield of between 500 and 1000 kg/ha in experimental 
trials. One potential drawback of this approach is the requirement 
of growth regulators which must be imported. Recent problems with 
input supply must be dealt with before a strategy which relies on 
imported inputs can be widely adopted. 
One recent release, Chimbai 40, has achieved yields of 3.8 
tons/ha in trials in Karakalpakstan and is currently being 
multiplied in preparation for general release. Work continues on 
other varieties, with particular attention being paid to 
verticillium wilt. In Khorezm, a new variety called Khorezm 126 
achieved yields of 5 tons/ha in trials and was reported to be able 
to raise yields 30% over existing varieties without altering any 
other inputs. 
As noted above, it has been reported by various researchers 
that inappropriate timing of irrigation of cotton can produce 
excessive vegetative growth and retard boll formation. It has been 
estimated that correction of this problem could raise yields by 10% 
while decreasing water consumption by 20%. 
Ouality 
A major problem in Uzbekistan, and one which receives less 
emphasis from the authorities, no doubt due to the fact that 
production plans are set in terms of weight, is the low quality of 
much of the cotton produced. There is a tradeoff between yield and 
quali ty both in production and in terms of plant improvement.
 
Breeding for yield, without controlling for quality, results in •
 
fibers which are both shorter and coarser.
 
This has significant economic implications. The world market 
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places a substantial premium on quality cotton, with differentials 
between world market prices and Uzbek exports amounting to as much 
as 20% due to lack of quality control and grading according to 
international standards. It should be noted that this discount can 
be recouped simply by consistent grading and marketing according to 
international norms. Improvements in actual quality, in addition 
to these gains from improved grading of existing quality, can 
provide additional gains. 
In addition to this quality discount, Uzbek cotton is 
discounted a further 4% from the average price for a particular 
grade on world markets largely due to problems with timely 
delivery. This means that improvements in quality can have as 
significant an impact on revenue as can increases in yield. If 
these impacts can be passed through to the farm level, there will 
be large incentives to improve quality at every stage of the 
growing and processing system. 
One of the main reason for the increasing emphasis on quality 
is the development of new spinning technologies designed to 
increase speeds and control costs. The new high speed technologies 
place an emphasis both on fiber strength and fineness, but also on 
cleanliness, since there are reduced opportunities in the 
manufacturing process to check for problems with quality in the raw 
material. 
This has implications for Karakalpakstan and Khorezm's ability 
to maximize the return to cotton exports, until the current 
reputation for inconsistent quality as well as for erratic delivery 
is overcome. However, it also has implications for the ability to 
develop a comparative advantage in the textile industry, because if 
Uzbekistan's textile manufacturers are forced to rely on low 
quality domestic cotton, they cannot take full advantage of the 
newer high speed, low cost spinning technologies which are in use 
in other countries. Given the fact that spinning is the most 
costly part of the process of creating cloth out of fiber, this is 
a significant disadvantage to moving beyond the stage of supplying 
raw materials to performing the downstream activities which provide 
value added. 
Probably the greatest single factor militating against 
improved quality is the state order system and the problems with 
marketing and payment that go along with it. This system relies on 
targets specified by weight at the farm level and so does not 
directly reward farmers for improved quality. In fact, there were 
widespread reports of use of any and all available ways to increase 
measured harvest weight, such as inclusion of extraneous plant 
matter, dirt, rocks, or other material in bales. It is notable 
­that Uzbek cotton gins have many more cleaning stages prior to 
ginning than is common in other countries. 
Solution of this problem has been achieved. in other countries 
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through concerted efforts at breeding consistent varieties, 
ensuring that planting zones are planted to a single variety, and 
ensuring that each gin operates solely on one variety. (It was 
reported that there are currently 10 or more varieties in general 
use in the study area.) Grading is also extremely important for 
product consistency, as this permits gins to produce runs using 
only a single grade of cotton. 
Equally important is a pricing system which rewards farmers 
for quality, which is only possible if grading is attributable to 
particular producers and if the price premium that results is 
passed back to the producer. These price premia are set by the 
world market and could easily be disseminated locally via regular 
reports on radio, television, or newpaper. 
Cotton Gins 
It is clear that ginning capacity is inadequate. Cotton is 
typically still being processed in late May, and in many areas is 
not entirely processed until sometime in June. Given the fact that 
the harvest is finished in the Fall of the previous year, this 
implies waits of up to six months or more for processing for the 
last runs at these gins. 
Table 16 shows generally accepted limits for safe storage of 
seed cotton before fiber deterioration begins. It is obvious that 
current practice in Uzbekistan results in delays far exceeding the 
recommended 30 days for even the dryest cotton. Accordingly, there 
is a clear case for additional ginning capacity to reduce this 
problem. It would be best to encourage private sector investment 
in new capacity in order to promote competition. A further problem 
in Uzbekistan is the poor quality and poor maintenance of cotton 
ginning equipment. This results in lower quality cotton and 
excessive waste, Installation of new capacity of better quality 
would help ameliorate this problem. 
Cotton Marketing 
The basis for cotton production and marketing is the state 
order. The state has a monopoly on cotton marketing and in the 
past set prices for the entire crop and required it all to be 
processed in state ginneries. Since 1995, the state has instituted 
a process whereby increasing shares of cotton target production 
will be procured at "free market prices". In fact, this program 
has been rendered largely ineffective in terms of providing 
adequate incentives at the farm level. ­
The general problem is one of excessive taxatation, both 
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implicit and explicit. Cotton is sold on the world market for 
prices which are already discounted 4% due to consistent problems 
with timeliness of delivery and consistency of product. These 
exports are actually performed by state trading companies which 
typically deal with international cotton traders rather than 
directly with processors, since the latter have strict delivery 
requirements which Uzbekistan has trouble meeting. As noted above, 
Uzbek cotton is also subject to a further discount of 20% due to 
lack of appropriate grading. 
This revenue is then taxed by the state at a rate of 32%. 
PaYment from the trading companies to domestic producers is 
denominated in local currency. Here, a maj or implicit tax is 
imposed in the use of the official exchange rate. Currently, that 
rate is 61 soumiS. Given parallel rates of between 140 and 145, it 
may be estimated that this implies a substantial further tax of 
somewhere between 30-60% depending on the assumed equilibrium 
exchange rate. This calculation is in fact quite conservative 
considering that paYments are sometimes delayed as much as 6 
months, during which time the official exchange rate may have 
changed. It was impossible to verify, but if the previous official 
exchange rate of 55 is used since that was the rate prevailing when 
the cotton was contracted for export, the implied tax would be 
proportionately larger. 
A further problem is the fact that paYments are made in the 
form of bank transfers and not in cash. Currently, there is a 40% 
premium on cash transactions, so this constitutes a further 
implicit tax on farmers. 
If we put all of these factors together farmers are receiving 
less that 30% and possibly less than 20% of the true value of their 
cotton even when they are receiving the supposedly free market 
prices for part of their crop. 
However, this is not the end of the story. It was widely 
reported that in those cases where producers failed to meet their 
target amounts, all of their crop was subject to state procurement 
at the state price. It was reported in Karakalpakstan that most 
producers in fact failed to achieve their targets and so were 
subjected to this problem. All in all, it is apparent that the 
supposed liberalization of the cotton market has had virtually no 
real effect on many farms and that in spite of any policy 
initiatives to the contrary, cotton farmers are still subject to 
state control to much the same extent as they have always been. 
There is one caveat to this conclusion - Normally, cotton 
under state order is processed by the gin but no credit is given to 
the producing unit for byproducts such as seed and lint, nor are ­
they returned to the producer. Since the value of these products 
is apparently included in the procurement price for "free" cotton, 
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there will be some additional benefit at the farm level. 
However, the overall picture is clear: there is substantial 
taxation of cotton, and the benefits of this taxation accrue almost 
exclusively to the central government and not to the Republic or 
oblast. At the farm level, cotton is a losing proposition, while 
gins do not appear to be making excess profits, and are in terms of 
the revenue flow only a collection point from which exports are 
made, with the revenue going to the central government. 
Though state orders are slated to be phased out in 1998, it 
remains uncertain whether this means that farmers will be permitted 
to grow any crop they choose, or that only state order prices will 
be phased out but producers will still be required to produce 
planned quantities. 
Marketing and Pricing of Other Crops 
Horticultural and meat products are both free of state 
planning and can be grown and marketed at uncontrolled prices. 
Horticultural products in particular and livestock to some extent 
are therefore produced largely on private plots. Local markets had 
ample supplies of a wide variety of fruits and vegetables, as well 
as meat, and many of these were reported to originate in other 
parts of Uzbekistan, such as Samarkand, making it clear that 
interregional trade in these commodities is not a problem. 
Rice and wheat are treated differently. As noted above, each 
of these commodities is produced according to state planning 
directives. While other sources have maintained that rice has 
been liberalized, (See, e.g. the Uzbekistan Agricultural Baseline 
Survey), the state grain milling enterprise was unequivocal in 
stating that farmers were required to produce planned amounts. The 
plan target for each producing unit is divided in two parts. The 
first part is sold to the state at a fixed price, while the second 
part is provided at an "agreed" price negotiated between the seller 
and the state enterprise which mills the grain (Uzklebprodukt). 
Any farm which satisfies both the fixed price plan and the agreed 
price plan may then keep any excess to dispose of as they see fit ­
i.e. it may be used for own consumption, shipped to other regions, 
or exported from the country. 
No wheat has ever been sold at the "agreed" price in 
Karakalpakstan, implying that achievement of planned amounts has 
never exceeded 50% since wheat was first planted by state order in 
1993. (See Table 17 for these prices for the current year. The 
­various grades of wheat are distinguished by gluten content.) Last 
year, only 5% of republic requirements were satisfied with local 
production, with the remainder imported from abroad. While a 
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substantial amount of this wheat came from Kazakhstan last year, 
only a negligible amount came from this source in the current year, 
having been replaced from a variety of sources. 
The republic is almost self sufficient in flour milling 
capacity, with a reported 500 tons/day produced out of a required 
550 tons/day. This production comes from 4 mills (one ln 
Takhitashi, two in Nukus, and one in Kungrad) with a theoretical 
capacity of 730 tons/day. The resulting flour deficit is filled 
with imports from a variety of sources. Flour prices are also set 
by the government (See Table 17). Bread prices are also 
controlled, and the current price of 15 soum for a 600 gram loaf 
(approximately SUS 0.10 at the current parallel exchange rate) is 
quite low compared to world prices of flour and wheat. 
In the case of rice, production plans are usually fulfilled 
and some farms have on occasion exceeded both the amounts planned 
at the fixed price and that at the agreed price, and so have 
qualified for license to ship the rice out of the republic. The 
price paid to farmers in the last harvest for unmilled rice was 
18.5 soums/kg, while the agreed price was typically about 2-3 soums 
higher. Table 18 shows the structure of costs for rice processing. 
Last year, 24,752 tons were processed, most of this, (23,243 tons, 
rice classified as second grade. 
Independent milling of both rice and wheat is permitted, with 
farmers allowed both to operate mills if they choose, or to take 
their crop to private companies to be processed if they choose. 
However, exports from the republic are not permitted unless, as 
noted above, the plan has been fulfilled. It was reported that 
independent milling of rice is commonplace, while that of wheat is 
not, giving the state an effective monopoly on processing of wheat. 
Animal feed is also produced by the grain processing company, 
and is all sold at market prices. (Approximately 4-5 soum/kilo for 
cattle feed). There is some variation in this price both due to 
market factors and due to the varying composition of the feed, 
which is a mixture of milling residues and mineral and vitamin 
additives. It was reported that these additives were previously 
purchased from other parts of the FSU but are now produced in 
Uzbekistan. Unfortunately, the plant which produces them in 
Fergana, itself uses imported inputs and so has had output 
shortfalls which have affected production of feed in 
Karakalpakstan. 
-
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Input Supplies 
Seeds 
Cotton seed is provided by retention of 25% of seeds produced 
by gins while the remainder is crushed for oil. As noted above, 
there is an effort underway to improve seed production and 
certification through production by independent companies. This 
effort should be strongly supported to enable the multiplication of 
certified quality seed as needed by the producers. 
Conversations with cotton breeders indicated that improved 
varieties are available ( e.g. Chimbai 40 in Karakalpakstan, and 
Khorezm 126 in Khorezm as noted above) but that multiplication and 
distribution is a major bottleneck. However, plant varieties are 
released to the Ministry of Agriculture and Water, which then 
evaluates them according to a hierarchy of criteria. It 
wasreported in Khorezm that these, which amount to state ordered 
plant breeding objectives were, (in order of importance) : 
1. verticillium wilt resistance 
2. fiber yield 
3. early opening 
4. fiber strength 
It is notable that the only attribute related to quality ranks 
fourth and last in importance. General breeding targets in 
Karakalpakstan are increased yield, drought resistance, salt 
tolerance and disease resistance. 
The current cotton improvement project (see above) will go far 
toward addressing problems in cotton seed multiplication and 
distribution. Implementation has been somewhat delayed, but the 
project is expected to be completed by the end of the year 2000. 
For other crops a substantial share of requirements are 
satisfied by retention of own production, with the balance provided 
from state sources. This is particularly true in the case of wheat 
and rice. Horticultural crops rely to a significant extent on 
private suppliers, in line with their predominance in household 
plots. 
For rice and wheat there is no apparent systematic seed supply 
system. Most of the producers interviewed relied at least to some 
extent on retaining a portion of their crop for seed. Vegetable 
-

and fruit seeds are freely available in the local markets, though 
these were clearly not certified or regulated in any way. 
19 
Machinery 
A state enterprize, Uzselkhoztekhnika, is responsible for 
supplying and servicing tractors and other agricultural equipment. 
The current state of affairs is quite poor in many cases, with 
tractor fleets of 10 years of age or more. (See Table 19) In 
addition, there are significant problems with adequate maintenance 
and availability of spare parts. Table 20 shows figures for the 
current agricultural vehicle fleet in Khorezm, where it can be seen 
that less than 25% of tractors were actually functional. 
The move over the past two years toward provision of machine 
services from centralized tractor parks is an unfortunate 
recreation of a soviet style institutional structure that has 
proven to be suboptimal in all other contexts where it has been 
implemented. If, as is the case in Uzbekistan, operators are 
employees of the machinery company, they lack incentives and 
knowledge to do the best possible job on any particular field. In 
addition there are inevitable coordination problems as the question 
of who gets priority on use of the machines is decided by 
administrators who are not familiar with individual farm level 
conditions and who are employees of the state. 
The recent purchase of large Case tractors with a capacity 
four times greater than previously used machines is a move toward 
large scale, expensive equipment that is not suited for smallholder 
use. However, if these machines do in fact prove able to 
ameliorate the problem of a hard pan through deeper ploughing than 
smaller machines can accomplish, then they may well be worthwhile 
but it will be necessary for the government to achieve extremely 
high levels of machine use to make the fleet a viable economic 
proposition. 
Given the fact that there is a justifiable agronomic rationale 
for deep ploughing together with the fact that no single farmer or 
collective could possible afford to buy one, it seems reasonable to 
continue to allow them to operate, unsubsidized, as independent 
service contractors. (Currently, they operate on a contract basis 
but receive both implicit and explicit subsidies.) However, there 
is no economic rationale, and much negative experience, with 
machine tractor stations for smaller tractors. Further purchases 
of these by the central government do not seem justifiable and 
those that are already owned by the state could be sold off to 
private sector farmers as demanded. 
It is interesting to note that virtually every independent 
farmer interviewed in the course of this mission either had, or was 
planning to get, his own tractor and other machinery. The desire 
­for independence from centralized supply of machine services was 
near universal, underscoring the need for availability of tractors 
on the appropriate scale for these smallholders. Liberalization of 
imports of both new and used equipment could go. far toward meeting 
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this demand. 
Fertilizers and other Agrochemicals 
Both Khorezm and Karakalpakstan are areas in which soil is 
washed annually (or more than once annually) in order to leach out 
salts. This, together with frequent applications of irrigation 
water, means that fertilizers are also leached out of the soil and 
so must be applied at higher rates than would normally be the case. 
Researchers in Khorezm reported that plants actually use only 
around 45% of the amounts applied, thus justifying the high 
application rates recommended in the region. 
Fertilizers and agro-chemicals are supplied by a state 
enterprise, Uzchemservis. This company exists primarily to service 
the needs of the collective sector, but will also sell to 
independent farmers if supplies are available. While domestic 
production capacity exists, there has been insufficient supply in 
recent years. Imports of a formula containing N=23 and P=23 
produced in Kazakhstan have satisfied some of the demand, while 
former potash imports from Russia have been reduced to nil or a 
very low level until this year when 21,000 tons were delivered. 
(It was reported that farmers are often reluctant to use potassium 
since though it is a necessary nutrient, it is also a salt (KCI).) 
Prices are relatively high, both because of withdrawal of 
subsidies but also because of the need to transport supplies by 
rail through Turkmenistan. It was reported that Turkmenistan is 
imposing transit charges amounting to 25-30% of the final price. 
However, prices are still tied to the official exchange rate and so 
contain an implicit subsidy depending on the extent to which this 
diverges from the equilibrium rate. 
Use of other chemicals is down by more than half over the past 
two years, in part due to higher prices but also due to problems 
with availability. Pesticides are imported from Germany, while 
domestically manufactured defoliants are unavailable because the 
factory lacks required imports to make them. It should be noted, 
however, that some of these chemicals are used primarily in 
conjunction with machine harvest. Growth regulators cause cotton 
plants to switch from vegetative growth to boll production and so 
result in fields where all plants are ready for harvest at the same 
time. Defoliants strip plants of leaves prior to machine picking 
so as to reduce the trash content of seed cotton. Neither of these 
are necessary if labor intensive methods are used instead of 
mechanical ones. 
•Uzchemservis is plagued by problems of non-payment by farmers 
who in turn are plagued by problems of non-payment for their crops. 
Thus there is a cascade effect of arrears, which in the end causes 
the system to default to one of physical planning since supplies 
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are given to farmers without requiring a down payment. 
It was reported that there exist deposits of bentonite within 
Karakalpakstan, and that the ore contains 4-5% potassium along with 
a variety of micronutrients. It was reported that it is feasible 
to mine up to 200,000 tons/year but that the necessary equipment is 
not available. Field trials with fertilizer from this source have 
been performed and it was possible to achieve a yield of 3.5 
tons/ha. with cotton. 
Given past problems with fertilizer supply and distribution, 
there is a good case to be made for immediate withdrawal of the 
state from fertilizer distribution and marketing, an end to 
explicit or implicit subsidies, and encouragement of private sector 
companies in this area. The state company could continue to 
operate as a wholesale supplier from depots in Nukus and Urgench, 
open to all suppliers and in competition with any private sector 
suppliers who wish to operate. 
Extension 
Currently, technical information is disseminated via 
agronomists located within each kolkhoz. However, it is not 
necessary for most farmers to be aware of these developments as 
their job requires fulfilling tasks designed by the administrators 
of the collective on which they are working. 
This situation will change if there is true land tenure reform 
resulting in smaller production units with real independence. 
These farmers will need extension advice on a wide variety of 
issues which were previously resolved at higher levels. It would 
be possible to achieve such a system relatively quickly by 
instituting a retraining program for kolkhoz level agronomists and 
placing them in the Association of Private Farmers, which is 
already geared toward giving private sector advice and which in 
Khorezm already finances itself in part through per hectare levies 
on independent farmers. (This could not be verified in 
Karakalpakstan, and may be a feature which was inherited when it 
was merged with the Association of Smallholders.) It may be useful 
to rotate these workers to other raions so as to avoid the 
appearance of the continuation of previous administrative 
relationships. Organization of an extension system on a raion 
basis rather than by kolkhoz would also help in this regard. 
In addition, regular radio programs presenting technological 
and market information would be extremely useful. Many farmers are 
completely unaware of general market conditions, prices, etc. and • 
can be made aware of other useful information in this way at a 
relatively low cost. 
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Far.m Budgets and Crop Choice 
Crop budgets for the three most important crops, cotton, rice 
and wheat, were calculated and are presented in Chabot & Kyle, 1997 
(Crop Budgets for Western Uzbekistan, Cornell Department of 
Agriculture, Resource and Managerial Economics Working Paper No. 
97-12). Most of the information used to construct these budgets 
was collected during field visits in May and June of 1997 and was 
supplemented with various other sources as identified in the notes 
contained in the appendix. 
Overall, Khorezm enjoys relatively better conditions, and 
consequently has higher yields for each crop than does 
Karakalpakstan. It is for this reason that the profitability of 
farming is substantially higher in Khorezm. This situation is even 
more pronounced due to the operation of the state order system, 
which imposes substantial financial penalties for non-fulfillment 
of the state order amounts. For this reason, Karakalpakstan, which 
failed to planned amounts for cotton, and which has remarkably low 
yields for wheat, showed negative financial returns for these 
crops. 
The crop budgets make it clear that cotton is always 
economically viable in both regions and is the preferred crop under 
fully liberalized conditions as depicted in scenario D. This 
result is quite robust, and comes through clearly in virtually any 
manipulation of the figures in any of the crop budgets. It is in 
strong contrast to the current financial return, which is negative 
in Karakalpakstan, and quite low in Khorezm. In fact, the 
financial return in Karakalpakstan was negative in all scenarios 
except that which postulated a 30% yield increase. 
Rice as currently grown is the most attractive crop in 
financial terms, but generates negative economic returns once the 
value of water is included in costs. It should be noted that water 
use here has been assumed to be 35,000 m3/hectare, the average 
usage reported by SANIIRI. If it is instead assumed to be 50,000 
m3, as has been reported in some instances, rice is no longer 
financially viable under any circumstances which include paYments 
for water. 
Wheat is a losing proposition for farmers in both 
Karakalpakstan and in Khorezm. It remains the least preferred crop 
under all conditions and is not capable of generating a profit for 
farmers in Karakalpakstan even under the most optimistic of 
assumptions. It fares somewhat better in Khorezm, since yields 
­there are half again as large as the (somewhat optimistic) 
assumption of 1.2 tons/hectare in Karakalpakstan. 
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In summary, it is clear that cotton is the economically 
preferred crop in the Aral Sea region, and that under liberalized 
conditions would be chosen by farmers facing realistic input and 
output prices. The current widespread enthusiasm for rice 
cultivation is apparently largely due to the fact that water is 
free. Rice would be likely to be grown in the Amu Darya delta and 
in Khorezm under liberalized conditions, but to a lesser extent 
than is currently the case. Wheat would not be grown at all by 
profit motivated farmers. It can be imported from Kazakhstan much 
more cheaply than it can be grown under current conditions in the 
Aral Sea region. 
A final note is in order regarding water pricing, since this 
is perhaps the most contentious issue regarding liberalization of 
the agricultural sector in Uzbekistan. In order to allow a 
reasonable evaluation of the importance of water pricing in each of 
the cases presented, a final item was included labelled 'Return to 
Water'. This item shows what price would have to be charged for 
water in order for the crop concerned to just break even. It can 
be seen that the returns to water are quite high in many cases, but 
that its value in production of wheat is in fact negative under 
many conditions. 
-
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Tables 
-

Table 1. Khorezm· Agricultural Production in 1995 and 1996 (tons) 
Total Kolkhoz Private Fanns 
1995 1996 1995 1996 1995 1996 
Cotton 304,694 290,042 304,694 290,042 -­ -­
Grains 
Wheat 
202,762 249,925 179,605 217,716 23,157 32,209 
Rice 
44,853 63,181 38,231 53,553 6,622 9,628 
Corn 
124,425 172,546 113,925 155,606 10,500 16,940 
Potatoes 
28,476 9,898 26,456 7,343 2,020 2,555 
Vegetables 
27,559 27,998 4,889 3,348 22,670 24,650 
Melons 
140,120 144,092 43,829 41,400 96,291 102,692 
Fruits 
42,645 42,838 14,785 12,678 27,860 30,160 
Grapes 
35,862 36,589 12,833 12,074 23,029 24,515 
11,568 8,344 6,543 3,308 5,025 5,036 
Source: Goscomprognostat 
-
.' 
Table 2. Karakalpakstan: Agricultural Production, 1995-1996 (tons 
1995 1996 
Wheat 
Rice 
Cotton 
Potatoes 
Vegetables 
Fruit 
Grapes 
34,056 
141,912 
288,223 
4,778 
66,238 
4,171 
568 
20,532 
201,562 
203,921 
10,759 
77,191 
4,541 
1,616 
Source: Goscornprognostat 
-

Table 3. Khorezm: Planted Area· 1996 (hectares) 
Wheat 28,847 
Rice 44,561 
Seed Com 1,898 
Other Grain 583 
Cotton 100,967 
Sunflower 44 
Other Industrial 41 
Potatoes 535 
Vegetables 2,658 
Melons 1,398 
Fodder Crops 31,963 
-

Source: Goscomprognostat 
Table 4. Karakalpakstan: Planted Area 1996 (hectares) 
Wheat 
Rice 
Other Grains 
Cotton 
Potatoes 
Vegetables 
Melons 
Fruit 
Grapes 
33,927 
100,288 
10,635 
146,611 
2,025 
8,231 
7,250 
2,739 
345 
Source: Goscomprognostat 
-

Table 5. Kaakalpakstan: Returns on Cotton Producing Kolkhozes, 
1995-96 
1995 1996 
Turfbul 
Beruni 
Ellikalla 
Amu Darya 
Khodzeli 
Shunnana 
Kanlykul 
Kungrad 
Kegeili 
Chimbai 
Karauzyak 
Tahtakupir 
Bozatau 
Total 
% 
-26.6 
-36.4 
-29.1 
-8.1 
-6.0 
-11.9 
-19.8 
-23.0 
+2.2 
-8.1 
-22.6 
-36.3 
-3.7 
-18.00 
% 
-45.8 
-49.6 
-45.7 
-40.9 
-46.4 
-51.3 
-42.5 
-31.1 
-58.4 
-43.7 
-51.6 
-37.9 
-36.2 
-44.7 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Water 
-

Table 6. Khorezm: Livestock Production 1995-96 
Total of which: Private Plots 
1995 1996 1995 1996 
Cows 
Pigs 
Sheep and Goats 
Horses 
Camels 
Rabbits 
Poultry 
167,347 
12,494 
174,959 
2,435 
82 
6,395 
1,540,250 
171,999 
7,418 
180,636 
3,292 
82 
5,575 
1,365,380 
132,841 
726 
131,403 
1,218 
13 
5,938 
540,000 
137,038 
831 
142,740 
2,062 
16 
5,451 
560,000 
Source: Goscomprognostat 
-

Table 7. Karakalpakstan: Livestock Breeding, 1994-95 
1994 1995 
Total 
403,080 
487,156 
18,214 
4,913 
572,706 
of which 
private plots 
Total of which 
private plots 
Cows, bulls, calves 
Sheep and Goats 
Horses 
Camels 
Poultry 
267,694 
219,574 
7,449 
2,242 
386,514 
386,508 
485,819 
18,127 
4,997 
575,295 
265,671 
219,584 
7,867 
2,334 
382,841 
Source: Goscomprognostat 
-

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Water 
Table 8. Khorezm: Dekhan Farms by Type 
Number of Farms 
Total Crops Livestock Fish 
1996 956 289 667 9 
1997 1044 409 596 23 
... 
Table 9. Avera~e Yield of Specific Crops by Re~ion (tons/hectare) 
Fergana 
Region 
Central 
Region 
Southern 
Region 
Desert 
Region 
Aral Sea 
Region 
Total 
Cotton 
Wheat (irrigated) 
Rice 
Alfalfa (irrigated) 
Watermelon 
(irrigated) 
Melon 
Tomato 
3.0 
3.2 
2.9 
12.5 
16.2 
16.5 
24.5 
2.5 
3.0 
2.6 
10.6 
13.1 
9.1 
19.5 
3.4 
2.8 
2.1 
11.3 
13.2 
11.2 
18.0 
3.5 
1.9 
1.0 
15.4 
13.3 
9.2 
9.5 
2.0 
2.3 
1.9 
10.1 
12.3 
6.9 
8.7 
2.8 
2.9 
2.2 
11.8 
13.7 
8.7 
16.8 
Source: Uzbekistan Agricultural Baseline Survey, July 1996. 
-

Table 10. Chanl e in Land Area of Main Farms 1990-1996 by Re~ion 
Fergana 
Region 
Central 
Region 
Southern 
Region 
Desert 
Region 
Aral Sea 
Region 
Total 
Land Under 
Central Admin­
tration, 1990 
Land Under 
5,923 3,623 13,883 168,017 6,819 26,217 
Central Admin­
istration, 1996 
% Change in Land 
Area Under 
Central Admin­
4,837 3,295 13,237 160,347 5,931 24,701 
istration 18% -9% -5% -5% -4% -5% 
Total Area of Main 
Farms in 1996 
Land Under 
Central Admin­
istration as a % of 
Main Farms in 
6,114 3,862 14,168 166,500 6,423 26,163 
1996 79% 85% 93% 96% 92% 94% 
Source: Uzbekistan Agncultural Baselme Survey, July 1996. 
-

Table 11. Uzbekistan: Length of Canal System 
Length of farm irrigation canals 
State/Oblast Earth Concrete Piped Total Specifi- Farm 
canal lined cation network 
efficiency 
(km)(%) (rn/ha)(%) (%) (%) 
UZBEKISTAN 79 167,335 0.74 
Karakal'n 
19 2 39.6 
99 1 19,6740 39.2 0.63 
Andijan 79 17 4 10,580 37.5 0.69 
Bukhara 86 14 15,0630 57.1 0.66 
Djizak 13 79 7,8598 0.87 
Kashkadarya 
27.3 
57 4 19,0583 38.9 0.83 
Navoi 87 13 0 4,702 38.9 0.69 
Namangan 89 8 9,4323 34.5 0.78 
Samarkand 89 1 17,118 46.41 0.73 
Surkanarya 45 54 8,1231 25.8 0.73 
Syrdarya 51 6,55347 2 21.9 0.84 
Tashkent 85 11 12,2914 30.7 0.73 
Fergana 94 6 0 24,884 70.0 0.70 
Khorezm 99 12,0181 0 45.9 0.65 
-

Source: TACIS: WAR~AP Project Vol. 4 
Table 12. Uzbekistan: Types of Irrigation (percent of total) 
State/ Oblast 
Surface 
Furrow WildBasin Total 
Flood 
Sprink Drip 
-ler 
temp. pipe­ irrig. total
 
canal
 acc 
-irrigated area as percent of total-
UZBEKISTAN 
lines 
459 0 67 29 0 100 
Karakal'n 
8 0 
22 2055 2 1 58 0 0 100 
Andijan 74 4 100 
Bukhara 
0 78 20 1 0 0 
100 
Djizak 
65 1 73 26 0 08 0 
60 12 0 72 28 0 0 100 
Kashkadarya 
0 
14 34 0 100 
Navoi 
51 1 66 0 0 
100 
Namangan 
63 67 32 0 005 0 
740 269 23 0 0 100 
Samarkand 
5 
70 100 
surchandarya 
67 3 1 29 0 0 0 
63 4 1 68 100 
Syrdarya 
29 3 00 
70 2739 0 3 0 10032 0 
4Tashkent 66 0 70 26 1 03 100 
70 1Fergana 0 72 26 1003 0 0 
26 100Khorzem 4 0 30 58 11 0 0 
Source: TACIS: WARMAP Project Vol. 4 
-
•. 
Table 13. Land Area in Amudarya Basin with High Watertable and Salinity, 1987-89 
Depth of watenable in m Total Percent of land with Wtd 
watenable avo 
Depth 
Region 1-2 2-3 3-5 5-10<1 >10 <2m <3m <5m <10m 
Land area in 'OOOha 
Tajikistan 14712 71 40 201 590 14 39 46119 4.6 
Kyrgistan 0 270 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 
Turkmenistan 587 407 179 2224825 27 6422 205 83 2.9 
Uzbekistan 413520 467 158 2121 48 6723 539 26 3.9 
Karakalpak 97269 113 0 509 38 810 305 22 2.5 
1,744 27974 7457 1446 941 509 5671 57 3.4Total 
Degree of soil salinitv*
 
non-
 weak mod- severe very Total Percent ofland with 
erate severe salinity> than 
mod- very 
erate 
severe 
severe
 
Land area in 'OOOha
 
Tajikistan
 482 4266 0 0 590 7 0 
27 0 0 
2224 61 22 
2116 20 9 
709 48 9 
5666 38 13 
0
 
Kyrgista
 27 00 0 0 0
 
Turkmenistan
 574 480303 866 0 0
 
Uzbekistan
 717 228 177 10983 0
 
Karakalpak
 275211 65156 2 0 
14111951 1569 723 12 0i Total 
-

Source: TACIS - Warmap Project Vol. 4 
• * Non Saline 21.0 me Na/I00g soil 
• Weak 1- 3 
• Modern 3 - 6 
• Severe 6 - 12 
• Very Severe > 12 
Table 14. Illustrative Water Requirements Under Alternative Cropping 
Patternsa 
Crop Indicative Water Requirement (mJ/ha) 
Cotton 
Wheat 
Rice 
Vegetable 
Fodder 
Orchards(b) 
5875 
3870 
13 290 
7460 
8490 
5050/ 
4800 
Source: Preparation Study of the Uzbekistan Drainage Project Phase I: Final Report, Jan. 1997. 
Notes: a. Based on norms for "average" rainfall years and mean of norms for all RADU 
regions and excludes leaching requirements [Wichelns, 1994]. 
b.	 Patterns are used only to illustrate relationships between cropping pattern and 
water use and have not been derived to reflect projected patterns derived through 
agronomic considerations. 
-

Table 15. Summary of Estimated Total Yearly Recurrent and Capital Cost 
for Different Non-Traditional Irrigation Systems 
Without water With water Difference 
charge-total change-total 
cost cost (US$lhalyear) 
(US$halyear) (US$lhalyear) 
Hydraulic centre pivot (Frigate) 224 317I 93 
Electric centre pivot 3192 238 81 
Linear move centre ditch 267 348 813 
Raingun (electric) 4 505 598 93 
5 Raingun (motorpurnp) 665 758 93 
Sideroll (Volzhanka) 6 308 401 93 
Tractor boom sprinkler (DDA 100 MA) 2597 166 93 
Drip irrigation - cotton 906 978 728 
7939 Drop irrigation - v~etables 865 72 
10 Furrow irrigation - lTaditional 83 213 130 
11 Furrow irrigation - improved management 83 100183 
162Furrow irrigation - plastic sheets* 10012 62 
Furrow irrigation - siphons 19696 10013 
14 Furrow irrigation - gated sleeve 101 194 93 
121 21415 Furrow irrigation - gated pipe 93 
16 Furrow irrigation - surge irrigation 126 213 87 
Furrow irrigation - cablegation 20017 118 82 
Source: WARMAP Project Phase 2 - Report: Non-Traditional Irrigation Methods, December 1996. 
-

Table 16. Safe Storage of Seed Cotton 
Moisture Content of Seed Cotton 
(Percent Wet Basis) 
Days Storage 
8 - 10 
10 - 12 
12 ­ 14 
14 ­ 15 
30 
20 
10 
<3 
Source: World Bank Technical Paper No. 287, "Cotton Production Prospects for the Next 
Decade", 1996. 
-

Table 17. Karakalpakstan: Fixed Wheat and Flour Prices as of 
November 1996 
Wheat 
Grade 
1 
soum/ton 
18,038 
$US at Equilibrium 
Exchange Rate 
$180 
2 16,430 164 
3 14,467 145 
4 12,500 125 
5 11,140 111 
6 10,374 104 
Flour 
27,500 2751 
19,801 1982 
18,244 1823 
Source: Uzkhlebproduct 
-
Table 18. Karakalpakstan: Rice Processing Costs, 1996 
(soum per ton) 
Cost of Production 
Best Grade 
1st Grade 
2nd Grade 
Broken 
For Flour 
31,416 
29,030 
27,336 
9,791 
4,079 
Including 10%
 
Profit Margin
 
34,558
 
31,933
 
30,070
 
10,771
 
4,487
 
Including Taxes 
40,779 
37,681 
35,483 
12,710 
5,295 
...
 
Table 19. Avera~e A~e of Farm Vehicles (years) 
Fergana 
Region 
Central 
Region 
9 
6 
9 
8 
8 
7 
Southern 
Region 
Desert 
Region 
Aral Sea 
Region 
Total 
Trucks Main 
Associated 
14 
12 
9 
9 
10 
9 
10 
10 
9 
8 
10 
9 
Tractors 
(wheeled) 
Main 
Associated 
13 
10 
13 
9 
8 
8 
11 
8 
Tractors 
(tract) 
Main 
Associated 
12 
12 
9 
9 
9 
10 
9 
9 
10 
9 
Source: Uzbekistan Agricultural Baseline Survey 
-

Table 20. Khorezm: Farm Machinery, 1996 
Tractors 
of which: Currently Functioning 
Trucks 
Cotton Picking Machines 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Water 
(number of units)
 
11,019
 
2,215
 
3,161
 
789
 
-

Figures 
Figures 1 and 2 from Final Report for the Preparation Study of 
the Uzbekistan Drainage Project. 
Figures 3 and 4 from TACIS WARMAP project Volume 4. 
-
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Figure 3 
Water Table Depth and Crop Yields 
Karakalpakstan and Khorezm 
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Figure 4 
Soil Salinity, Fertilizer Use and Yield 
in Karakalpakstan and Khorezm 
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